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The distinguished historian Victor Vladimirovich Leontovitsch (1902–1959) was little known 
before the 1957 publication of his classic book Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland [A His-
tory of Liberalism in Russia]. Since then, Leontovitsch’s capital work has been translated into 
major European languages: first, into Russian (in 1980), then into French (in 1987), and final-
ly, into English (in 2012). Western historians widely reviewed Leontovitsch’s history of liberal-
ism on its initial publication, but few reviews mentioned Leontovitsch’s previous scholarship, 
and none endeavored to explain the connections between the earlier work and his study of 
liberalism. This two-part article, drawing on printed and archival sources, explores Leonto-
vitsch’s intellectual roots, his life and his creative activity from 1902 to 1947. It examines his 
view of Russian history, particularly, his conception of the interplay between law and politics 
in the reign of Ivan IV; his attitude toward Russian Orthodoxy; his attitude toward the French 
Revolution; his hostility to National Socialism and Nazi policy. This article also offers new 
material on the history of the post-1917 Russian emigration in Central Europe: it deals with 
Leontovitsch’s teachers in the Russian Faculty of Law in Prague, and also discusses his ties in 
the 1930s and 1940s with important emigré intellectuals, such as Aleksandr Makarov, Dmitrii 
Chizhevskii, and Fedor Stepun. 
Keywords: Leontovitsch, Russian History, Russian Faculty of Law in Prague, Russian Ortho-
doxy, Ivan the Terrible.
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Кто знал видного историка В. В. Леонтовича до издания в 1957 г. его знаменитой «Исто-
рии либерализма в России»? Впрочем, «знаменитой» книга стала гораздо позже, ведь 
на русский язык она была переведена только в 1980 г., а на английский и того позже — 
через 32 года! Но и тут возник своего рода казус, поскольку знаменитая книга, став 
таковой, не расширила знаний об авторе — ни в ученом мире, ни в широких кругах 
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читающей публики. Никто не взялся проанализировать процесс становления Леонто-
вича как личности и ученого, никто не посвятил этому серьезных научных трудов. Это 
тем более обидно, что Леонтович — один из крупных мыслителей российского и укра-
инского зарубежья, историк, правовед, создавший интересные и  ценные труды по 
истории и истории права. Автор статьи, опираясь на широкий круг опубликованных 
и архивных источников, восполняет этот досадный пробел. Читатель узнает о детстве 
и юности ученого, его развитии во время учебы в российской гимназии и на Русском 
юридическом факультете в Праге, в Париже в Свято-Троицком православном теологи-
ческом институте, о работе в этом же институте, переезде в Германию, об отношении 
к православной религии и нацизму. Леонтович не принял нацизм, критиковал его ло-
зунги. В статье проанализированы работы ученого времени его пребывания в Герма-
нии, которые охватывали широчайший круг проблем: историю русского церковного 
права в сравнении с протестантизмом, французское право, становление современного 
государства. Значительное внимание уделено анализу интересной работы Леонтовича, 
посвященной правлению Ивана Грозного, а также взаимовлиянию Леонтовича и ряда 
других крупных ученых русского и украинского зарубежья, таких как Александр Мака-
ров, Дмитрий Чижевский и Федор Степун. Портрет Леонтовича — это портрет целого 
поколения российской эмиграции, поколения, отвергшего диктатуру и в советской, и 
в нацистской форме, непонятого и обретшего лишь одиночество в ряду других поко-
лений.
Ключевые слова: Леонтович, русская история, Русский юридический факультет, Рус-
ское православие, нацизм.
III
Before leaving the question of Leontovitsch’s attitude toward National Socialism, let 
us reflect on two additional aspects of his situation: his personal disposition and his intel-
lectual network. Although Leontovitsch came from a politically engaged family and had 
been formed intellectually in the conservative-liberal wing of the Russian emigration, he 
portrayed himself as an apolitical man. In adolescence, he made friends with such differ-
ent types that he “could not make of them a single circle or group”. He focused so intently 
on reading books that he “never was a regular reader of newspapers, …[and] didn’t read 
them at all for weeks on end”1. In Germany, he kept to a tight circle of trusted friends and 
avoided an active social life. At home, he kept quiet about his life in Russia before emi-
grating and spoke only guardedly about contemporary politics2. In public, Leontovitsch 
apparently wore a “mask” behind which he hid his thoughts about politics; donning such 
a mask was a virtual necessity for outsiders under the National Socialists. Perhaps wearing 
a “mask” was also a function of Leontovitsch’s commitment to the Russian liberal tradi-
tion, which strongly distinguished the public sphere from the private sphere. Incidental-
ly, Leontovitsch’s apolitical conduct had little in common with Thomas Mann’s famous 
1 He added that sometimes he indulged in “binge-reading”: “I sometimes dove into several news-
papers in various languages.” [Leontovitsch], Lebensbeschreibung (unpublished, undated document, from 
private papers of the Leontovitsch family). P. 1. I am indebted to Parmen Leontovitsch and Julia Oswalt for 
a digital copy of this document. 
2 On the Leontovitsch’s social situation in Berlin and on Leontovitsch’s avoidance of inviting guests 
in groups, see: Oswald J. Zwischen den Welten 1934–1953 // Kriegskindheit und Nachkriegsjugend in zwei 
Welten. Deutsche und Russen blicken zurück / Hrsg. von B. Bonwetsch. Essen, 2009. S. 34–35. Oswalt noted 
that in 1944, when girls of her age joined the Bund Deutscher Mädel, her parents avoided telling her that 
involvement in the female equivalent of the Hitler Youth movement was “daft” (Ibid. P. 37).
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self-conception as “unpolitical man,” for Mann opposed the bourgeois, aesthetic realm to 
the political realm. He rejected political terms such as “freedom,” “legality,” and “truth” as 
unhelpful abstractions3.
Even though Leontovitsch conducted himself circumspectly, he could not have sur-
vived as a professional jurist or as an intellectual without friends. His loose network of 
associates included at least three key figures: the legal scholar Aleksandr Nikolaevich Ma-
karov; the linguist, philosopher and literary critic Dmitrii Ivanovich Chizhevskii (Tschize-
wskij); and the belletrist and philosopher Fedor Avgustovich Stepun.
Leontovitsch’s position at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für ausländisches und inter-
nationales Privatrecht might have been unsustainable if he had lacked the patronage of 
Aleksandr Nikolaevich Makarov — an expert on provisions of Soviet law relevant to in-
ternational private law4. Indeed, Makarov was probably the person chiefly responsible for 
securing Leontovitsch’s position at the Institute5. Makarov had received his training at St. 
Petersburg University before the war, and from 1914 to 1919 had served there as docent 
in the Law Faculty. In 1919, he was appointed professor of international law at Petrograd 
University — a post he retained until the authorities removed him in 1923, for failing to 
adopt the proper class-perspective in his book Osnovnye nachala mezhdunarodnogo chast-
nogo prava. Makarov’s approach in the book was to analyze conflicts between Soviet law 
and international legal norms as examples within a larger paradigm of conflicts between 
national statutes and international norms: to the Soviet authorities, this “comparative” ap-
proach was per se objectionable, because it treated Soviet law as a new iteration of an older 
pattern6. Makarov emigrated from the USSR to Germany in 1925 and established himself 
at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute in 1928. His European reputation rested largely on an 
extraordinary compilation of sources on private international law from sixty countries7. 
By 1937, when Leontovitsch joined the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute, Makarov was likely the 
most prominent legal scholar in the Russian diaspora. As a committed internationalist 
hostile to national particularism, he was a silent opponent of National Socialism. Makarov 
may, therefore, have been the only person at the Institute whom Leontovitsch trusted. Ac-
cording to Oswalt, the Leontovitschs socialized with Makarov and his family throughout 
the war8. 
Dmitrii Chizhevskii was one of the century’s great literary critics, and easily the most 
prolific in the Russian diaspora9. Like Leontovitsch, he came from a noble family with 
3 See: Mann T. Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. Berlin, 1918.
4 See: Makarov A. N.: 1) Liga natsii. Petrograd, 1922; 2) Osnovnye nachala mezhdunarodnogo chast-
nogo prava. Moscow, 1924; Makarov A. N. Osnovnye nachala mezhdunarodnogo chastnogo prava. Moscow, 
2005; 3) Pravovoe polozhenie inostrantsev v SSSR. Moscow, 1924; 4) Das russische Zwischenprivatrecht 
(internationales Privatrecht). Berlin, 1926; Makarov A. N., Loewenfeld W. Das internationale Privatrecht der 
europäischen und auseuropäischen Staaten. Berlin, 1929.
5 Oswalt J. Zwischen den Welten… S. 35.
6 The table of contents of Makarov’s book can be read at: Iuridicheskaia nauchnaia biblioteka izda-
tel’stvo “SPARK”. URL: http://www.lawlibrary.ru/izdanie10899.html (accessed 16.01.2015).
7 Makarov A. N., Loewenfeld W. Das internationale Privatrecht… Makarov was responsible for gather-
ing and systematizing the legal materials for this book. 
8 Oswalt J. Zwischen den Welten… P. 35.
9 For a bibliography of his works, see: Bibliografiia pechatnykh trudov D. I. Chizhevskogo 1912–1994 
// Chizhevskii D. I. Izbrannoe. In 3 vols. Vol. I. Materialy k biografii (1894–1977). Moscow, 2007. P. 772–807. 
Chizhevskii’s publications numbered over one thousand items; many drafts of articles he wrote just before 
or during the war remain unpublished.
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property in Ukraine, was educated in Kiev, and was forced to emigrate during the Rus-
sian civil war. Again, like Leontovitsch, he spent a decade in Prague (from 1923 to 1932), 
although Leontovitsch was a student there while Chizhevskii served as professor at the 
Ukrainian Pedagogical Institute. Like Leontovitsch, Chizhevskii took an academic po-
sition in Germany, in his case at the University of Halle, where from 1932  to 1945  he 
taught Slavic studies, philosophy, various Indo-European languages and the history of the 
Church10. Leontovitsch and Chizhevskii shared an interest in Russian intellectual histo-
ry: in 1935, Chizhevskii delivered a lecture course on “Ideological Currents in Russia in 
the XVIII and XIX Centuries”11. They also shared an interest in Church history: Leon-
tovitsch focused on the Church’s formation and early history in Byzantium, Chizhevskii 
on religious dimensions of early Russian literature, on Russian saints’ lives, on religion in 
Czech literature, and especially on the seventeenth-century Czech educational reformer 
Jan Amos Comenius whose “lost” work he found and edited12.
In his youth, Chizhevskii had been a committed Marxist: from 1912 to 1924, he be-
longed to the Menshevik faction of the Russian Social-Democrats, and after 1921 he asso-
ciated himself with the moderate wing of German Social-Democracy13. Around 1926, he 
experienced a religious conversion. He returned to Russian Orthodoxy not as the one true 
Church, but instead he embraced Orthodoxy alongside “the great Western confessions”14. 
His sympathy for both Eastern and Western Christianity made him an ecumenist not 
unlike Leontovitsch.
Like Leontovitsch’s posts in Berlin, Chizhevskii’s academic position in Halle was pre-
carious. The Halle University authorities had promised him a chair in 1932, but they re-
neged on this promise the next year, when the Nazis came to power. For them it was risky 
to install an émigré Slav in a permanent post, but their main hesitation in appointing 
Chizhevskii had to do with his Jewish wife, Lidiia Marshak. The Halle chief of police asked 
the university to dismiss Chizhevskii from the faculty, but the dean defied the local police 
by keeping Chizhevskii as an adjunct lecturer15.
From various sources, we know that Chizhevskii opposed National Socialism. In his 
1945 autobiography, he noted that much of his scholarship on philosophical and political 
problems “showed the absurdity of the National-Socialist worldview.” During the 1930s, 
he offered “material assistance” to several Czech and Polish Jews; during the war, he sent 
books and items of necessity to Russian and Polish prisoners of war. He resented the Ge-
stapo for ordering him to stay in Halle during the war16. In this same autobiography, he 
10 Chizhevskii D. I. Avtobiografiia (1933), Avtobiografiia (1934), Avtobiografiia (1941) // Ibid. P. 45–47.
11 Ibid. P. 47.
12 On Chizhevskii’s contributions to Comenius’ studies, see: Korthaase W. Chto proiskhodilo s glavnym 
sochineniem Komenskogo ‘Consultatio catholica’ s 1934 po 1945 god // Chizhevskii D. I. Izbrannoe. V trekh… 
P. 316–327; Patocka J. O komeniologicheskikh trudakh Dmitriia Chizhevskogo // Ibid… P. 328–336.
13 Chizhevskii D. I. Tvorcheskaia avtobiografiia. Iiul’ 1945  goda //  Chizhevskii  D. I. Izbrannoe… 
P. 51–52.
14 Ibid. P. 52.
15 Ibid. P. 49. For another reference to Chizhevskii’s difficult position, see: Berkefeld W. Malen’kii 
kruzhok v Galle //  Chizhevskii  D. I. Izbrannoe… P. 309–315.  — In his 1962  address to the Heidelberg 
Academy of Sciences, Chizhevskii mentioned that, at Halle, “I could expect dismissal at any moment.” 
See: Chizhevskii D. I. Rech’ po sluchaiu izbraniia deistvitel’nym chlenom Geidel’bergskoi Akademii Nauk 
(1962) // Ibid. P. 72.
16 Chizhevskii D. I. Tvorcheskaia avtobiografiia. Iiul’ 1945  goda //  Ibid. P. 50. During the war 
Chizhevskii was under orders not to leave the confines of the city.
576 Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2018. Т. 63. Вып. 2
boasted that, among close friends from Freiburg, “not a single person became a National 
Socialist; moreover, many fought National Socialism from the time of its establishment.”17 
In a 1945  letter to Thomas Mann, Chizhevskii declared himself sympathetic to a large 
group of German intellectuals “who for twelve years said and did nothing that they might 
not have said or done without Hitler,” although he conceded: “some of them perhaps keep 
silent, spoke softly and acted cautiously” in those years18. One of his student acquaintances 
from Halle recalled that, in 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Chizhevskii 
“had no illusions about the catastrophic outcome for Germany”19.
Chizhevskii repudiated the Europe of his day for its national egoisms. He advocat-
ed the “overcoming of obstacles to mutual understanding and peace among peoples.” He 
sought “ways to bring about the cultural alignment of European peoples,” and proposed 
that the key to Europe’s future lay in “the flowering of European scholarship”20. In his 
1945 letter to Mann, Chizhevskii insisted that European culture could not cohere unless 
Germany’s post-war isolation was overcome and unless the Germans recovered both their 
human dignity and sense of self-worth21. It is possible that Chizhevskii stayed in Germany 
during the war mainly because he had discovered in Comenius’ lost work a template for a 
united Europe based on humanist values22.
According to Oswalt’s memoirs, in 1943, the Leontovitschs stayed in Halle at 
Chizhevskii’s apartment when they were seeking a place to live outside Berlin. She remem-
bered that Chizhevskii advertised his non-German background by shouting to a student 
that he did not greet anyone by saying “Heil Hitler.” According to Oswalt, Leontovitsch 
also stayed at Chizhevkii’s apartment in winter 1944–1945 when he was lecturing in Ber-
lin23. In post-war correspondence with Semen Ludvigovich Frank, Chizhevskii noted that 
“among teachers [of Russian] there remain only Leontovitsch (as Privatdozent in Byzan-
tine law) at Frankfurt, myself and Stepun. All the rest, including everyone sympathizing 
with the ‘German national spring” have fled as ‘refugees’ and quite successfully hidden 
themselves in Switzerland”24.
Fedor Stepun was one of the most extraordinary figures of the Russian diaspora. A 
philosopher trained in Moscow and Heidelberg, he defended his doctoral dissertation in 
1910 on the thought of Vladimir Solov’ev25. During the Great War, he served as an artillery 
officer in the Russian army — an experience he captured in a series of trenchant letters 
17 Chizhevskii studied philosophy in Freiberg in the early 1920s, just after his emigration from 
Ukraine. Chizhevskii D. I. Tvorcheskaia avtobiografiia. Iiul’… P. 51.
18 D. I. Chizhevskii — T. Mannu. Letter of 27 October 1945 // D. I. Chizhevskii. Izbrannoe… P. 173. 
On this letter, see: Korthaase W. Dmitrii Chizhevskii i rodina ego vybora Germaniia // Dmytro Čyževskyj, 
osobnost a dílo: sborník příspěvků z mezinárodní konference pořádané Slovanskou knihovnou při Národní 
knihovně ČR… 13. — 15. června 2002 v Praze / ed. by Z. Rachůnkova. Prague, 2004. P. 101–128.
19 Berkefeld W. Malen’kii kruzhok… P. 315.
20 Chizhevskii D. I. Tvorcheskaia avtobiografiia. Iiul’… P. 56–57.
21 D. I. Chizhevskii — T. Mannu… P. 175.
22 Chizhevskii had discovered Comenius’ great work, Consultatio catholica, in Halle in 1934. He 
dedicated much time in the next decade to transcribing and editing this enormous manuscript of nearly 
four thousand pages. The editors of Materialy k biografii, Vladimir Iantsen, Iryna Valiavko and Werner 
Korthaase, argue in their commentary that Chizhevskii’s editorial work on, and search for, new Comenius 
manuscripts “were among the most important reasons that he stayed in Nazi Germany, at the risk of his life.” 
See: Kommentarii // Chizhevskii D. I. Izbrannoe… P. 562. 
23 Oswalt J. Zwischen den Welten… P. 36.
24 D. I. Chizhevkii — S. L. Franku, letter of 9 March 1947 // D. I. Chizhevskii. Izbrannoe… P. 185–186.
25 Stepun F. Wladimir Solowjew. Leipzig, 1910.
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written between September 1914 and May 191726. In them, Stepun made clear his oppo-
sition to a brutal conflict lacking a metaphysical purpose, a conflict that amounted to the 
forced slaughter of millions of men at the bidding of state authorities27. Although a man of 
the left, Stepun claimed never to have been a revolutionary. Still, he received news of the 
February revolution “joyously,” seeing in it the possibility of an exit from disastrous war28. 
In April 1917, Stepun became a member of the All-Russia Soviet of Workers’, Peas-
ants’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, a body he described as “a formless and unwieldy institu-
tion”29, whose members “interested themselves solely in ideological flights of fancy”30. 
Observing from the Soviet the hapless Provisional Government, he decided that the in-
competence of both institutions was only preparing the way for Russia’s military defeat 
and ultimate disintegration. Furthermore, he feared that February 1917’s optimism would 
propel to power the leader of the extreme left, Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, whom he remem-
bered as “archaically monumental,” calculating and self-possessed, a man who, “thinking 
about the revolution in utter solitude, nevertheless lived by mass psychology”31. To set the 
revolution on a constructive path, Stepun accepted in June an invitation to serve in the 
war ministry under Aleksandr Fedorovich Kerenskii, as head of the political department. 
For some months, Stepun became a kind of official propagandist whose editorials in the 
newspaper Invalid did little to improve the army’s morale or to stabilize Russia; instead, 
holding the position led Stepun by late summer 1917 into making a short-lived, ill-starred 
alliance with Kerenskii, General Lavr Georg’evich Kornilov and commissar Boris Vik-
torovich Savinkov32.
Stepun’s political experiences in 1917 — he was one of few creative intellectuals to 
have served both in the Soviet and in a government ministry — haunted him for the rest 
of his life. At first, after the Bolshevik revolution, he sought to put matters rights by si-
multaneously collaborating with and criticizing Soviet cultural institutions. In 1918–1919, 
Stepun worked in Moscow’s “Theater of Revolution,” where he tried to re-introduce into 
the dramatic repertoire tragic plays, such as Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, and to avoid contem-
porary plays full of Marxist agitation. In 1920, at a public gathering in Moscow’s Malyi 
teatr, he portrayed the theater both as a means of writing history and as a cultural counter-
weight to governments in power — a view that some spectators took as an open challenge 
to the new regime. Stepun himself called the gathering “the last peaceful protest by Old 
Moscow against the communist party”33. In winter 1919–1920, he took part in Nikolai 
Nikolaevich Berdiaev’s Free Academy of Russian Culture — a venue for the Russian intel-
26 The letters from 1914  to December 1916  appeared in censored form under a pseudonum, as: 
Lugin N.: 1) Iz pisem artillerista-praporshchika // Severnye zapiski. 1916. N. 6. P. 150–170; 2) Iz pisem ar-
tillerista-praporshchika // Severnye zapiski. 1916. N. 7–8. P. 145–160; 3) Iz pisem artillerista-praporshchika 
// Severnye zapiski. 1916. N. 9. P. 9–23; 4) Iz pisem artillerista-praporshchika // Severnye zapiski. 1916. N. 11. 
P. 108–120; 5) Iz pisem artillerista-praporshchika // Severnye zapiski. 1916. N. 12. P. 1–13. The full version of 
the letters was published in book form as N. Lugin [pseudonym of Fedor Stepun]: Stepun F. Iz pisem prapor-
shchika-artillerista. Moscow, 1918. See also: Stepun F. Iz pisem praporshchika artillerista. Prague, 1926.
27 On Stepun’s war letters, see: Hufen C. Fedor Stepun. Ein politischer Intellektueller aus Russland in 
Europa. Die Jahre 1884–1945. Berlin, 2001. S. 70–73.
28 See: Stepun F. Byvshee i nesbyvsheesia. Moscow; St. Petersburg, 1995. P. 311–312.
29 Ibid. P. 337.
30 Ibid. P. 341.
31 Ibid. P. 345, 358.
32 On Stepun’s “governmental carrier” see: Hufen C. Fedor Stepun… S. 80–85.
33 Ibid. S. 94.
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lectual opposition to develop its views. Friendship with Berdiaev and other philosophical 
Idealists, along with Stepun’s role in the 1922 publication Oswald Spengler and the Decline 
of Europe, resulted in his expulsion from Soviet Russia in summer 192234.
In emigration, between 1922 and 1928, Stepun wrote a series of essays under the title, 
Thoughts on Russia [Mysli o Rossii], for the journal Sovremennye zapiski35. The essays 
constituted reflections on the Russian revolution from cultural, historical and philosoph-
ical perspectives. The essays equated Bolshevism with chaos and destructiveness but also 
dismissed the White movement for its retrograde monarchism. Stepun argued, following 
Dostoevskii’s premise of universal responsibility, that politically active Russians of all 
stripes bore collective guilt for the revolution36. He lamented Russians’ lack of patrio-
tism, their failure to generate ethically and legally defensible notions of property, and 
their hostility to genuine democracy. He called for an affirmation of personhood based 
on belief in God, human dignity and the rootedness of individuals in the community37. 
He interpreted literature in the civil war period as a subversive force, as a venue in which 
concrete ethics confronted an abstract, life-denying ideology38. In a 1925 essay distin-
guishing between the socialist idea and Bolshevik ideology, Stepun portrayed Lenin as 
a dogmatic and fanatical ideologue, who combined Marx’s commitment to centraliza-
tion with the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin’s lust for destruction39. Stepun’s Thoughts on 
Russia stimulated Leontovitsch investigation into the groundedness of the revolution in 
Russian culture, and also contributed to Leontovitsch’s curiosity about the lack of prop-
erty-consciousness among Russian peasants. Stepun’s 1934 book Das Antlitz Russlands 
und das Gesicht der Revolution [The Visage of Russia and Face of the Revolution], based on 
Thoughts on Russia, appeared just as Leontovitsch finished his master’s degree in Prague 
and re-located to Berlin40.
As we have seen, Stepun commanded wide interest in the Russian diaspora for his 
range of political experiences and for the acuteness of his observations about Russian 
society before and after 1917. But in the early 1930s, he also earned a reputation as a 
perceptive analyst of German society and politics. This reputation grew out of his work 
at the Technische Hochschule in Dresden, where he taught sociology from 1925 to 1937. 
Although some of his early Dresden lectures dealt with elementary sociological subjects 
(he taught sociological method and a course called “Sociology of Large Cities”) and with 
problems raised by the Russian revolution (he taught a course called “Fundamental Prob-
lems of the Revolution,” and another one, on the relationship between Bolshevik ideology 
and social practice), in the late 1920s he started to explore German sociology and the so-
ciological problem of masses and leadership. In the 1930s, he offered lectures on cultural 
sociology in contemporary life, on German social and political theory, and, in 1936, on 
34 For an overview of these events, see: Ibid. P. 85–99. For the essay on Spengler, see: Stepun F. Os-
val’d Shpengler i Zakat Evropy //  Osval’d Shpengler i Zakat Evropy /  eds N. A. Berdiaev, J. M. Bukshpan, 
F. A. Stepun, S. L. Frank. Moscow, 1922. P. 5–33.
35 For an authoritative discussion of these essays, see: Hufen C. Fedor Stepun… S. 165–186, 220–236.
36 See: Stepun F. Mysli o Rossii // Sovremennye zapiski. 1923. Vol. XV. P. 281–296.
37 Ibid. P. 299.
38 Ibid. P. 342–371.
39 Ibid. P. 350, 359.
40 Stepun F. Das Antlitz Russlands und das Gesicht der Revolution. Bern; Leipzig, 1934; see also the 
English version: Stepun F. The Russian Soul and the Revolution translated by Erminie Huntress. New York; 
London, 1935.
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“Tribe [Volk], Race and Culture”41. Stepun’s Dresden studies gave him material for sophis-
ticated essays on National Socialism as a social and political phenomenon. 
Between 1930  and 1932, Stepun published a series of articles on German politics 
and National Socialism under the title Letters from Germany [Pis’ma iz Germanii]42. In 
1933, he added a powerful article on Hitler’s ascent to the office of Reichskanzler43, and 
in 1933–1924, a programmatic article upholding his own Christian politics as an antidote 
to National Socialism44. These articles, widely read in the Russian diaspora, cemented his 
reputation as an anti-Bolshevik and anti-Nazi theorist.
In his 1932 article on the German presidential elections, Stepun referred to the “battle 
of ideas” and to the “militarization” of political programs in Germany45. He noted that 
the National Socialists, by their “irresponsible demagoguery,” had managed to “hypno-
tize” much of the German public46. However, he cited evidence that, beneath the public 
furor over politics, there ran deeper currents: the confused attachment of conservative 
Christians to Karl Barth’s mistaken idea that political engagement of any sort requires an 
“unclean conscience”47; popular curiosity about the Russian revolution and popular hun-
ger for a revolution in Germany48; the political incompetence of Germany communists49; 
the incoherence of the National Socialist movement, its reliance on protesting the Treaty 
of Versailles, its failure to frame a positive program, and its bizarre fabrication of Ersatz 
Christianity to serve as a political slogan50. Stepun reported listening to an unimpressive 
speech by Adolph Hitler at a Nazi party rally. He noted that, although Hitler had “said 
nothing,” faith in him had become a kind of “psychosis that will not quickly dissipate”51.
In his 1933 essay on Hitler’s January selection as chancellor and on the July arrest 
of Social-Democratic leaders in Prussia, Stepun spoke of “a devastating blow to democ-
racy dealt by the National Socialists”52. He complained that Hitler had “disarmed and 
destroyed democracy by democratic methods, by using the rules of a rule-of-law state”53. 
Stepun laid considerable blame for this outcome on the “intellectual parochialism” of So-
cial Democrats, a parochialism he related to their lack of religiosity, to their lack of patri-
otism, and to their “bourgeois outlook”54. He now argued that the National Socialists had 
seized the banner of revolution from the Social Democrats, a seizure of political initiative 
he interpreted as “the victory of revolutionary evil over revolutionary good.” He predicted 
that now Germany would not move toward a new medieval age, but rather toward “some 
41 See: Hufen C. Fedor Stepun… S. 573–574. 
42 See: Luganov N.: 1) Pis’mo iz Germanii (Formy nemetskogo sovetofil’stva) // Sovremennye zapiski. 
1930. Vol. XLIV. P. 448–463; 2)  Pis’ma iz Germanii (Natsional’ sotsialisty) //  Sovremennye zapiski. 1934. 
Vol. XLV. P. 446–474; 3) Pis’ma iz Germanii (vokrug vyborov presidenta respubliki) // Sovremennye zapiski. 
1932. Vol. XLIX. P. 402–421. Nikolai Luganov is a pseudonym for Fedor Stepun. 
43 [Stepun F.] Redaktsiia. Germaniia prosnulas’ // Novyi grad. 1933. Vol. VII. P. 3–24.
44 Stepun F.: 1) Khristianstvo i politika // Sovremennye zapiski. 1933. Vol. LIII. P. 335–352; 2) Khris-
tianstvo i politika // Sovremennye zapiski. 1934. Vol. LV. P. 308–325.
45 Stepun F. Pis’ma iz Germanii… P. 402.
46 Ibid. P. 403.
47 Ibid. P. 408.
48 Ibid. P. 408–410.
49 Ibid. P. 411–413.
50 Ibid. P. 413–414.
51 Ibid. P. 418.
52 Stepun F. Germaniia prosnulas’… P. 3.
53 Ibid. P. 4. 
54 Ibid. P. 5.
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sort of new barbarism”55. Stepun linked the coming disaster to the Nazis’ successful ma-
nipulation of mass psychology through the radio and to the Nazis’ freakishly clear sense of 
Germans’ “collective spirit”56. He hoped that the Nazi hold on Germans would eventually 
weaken, and indeed, he anticipated it must: the Nazis’ political pose was a “betrayal of 
truth,” a “betrayal of freedom,” a betrayal of Christianity and of the German nation57. He 
called National Socialism a method of “Bolshevizing the soul of national Germany,” while 
using opposition to Bolshevism as a “national poison”58. Yet he thought the Nazis “more 
terrible than Bolshevism,” because they hid their destructive program behind seductive 
slogans. He feared that, in the end, National Socialism would mean nothing other than 
concentration camps and self-destructive racism59.
In a private letter to the theologian Paul Tillich in 1934, Stepun complained about “the 
claustrophobic atmosphere” in Germany, where he could speak candidly with fewer than 
“eight to ten people.” He reported the killing of the Röhm faction of the NSDAP in June 
1934 as evidence that Hitler had turned away from a revolution against capitalism, and 
that the Nazi authorities were now trying to cement “an alliance between the Reichswehr 
and big capital.” He told Tillich that the best students in Dresden were listening carefully 
to lectures on political theory concerning the thought of Vilfredo Pareto, Georges Sorel, 
and Carl Schmitt; however, he admitted that many students still gravitated toward Na-
tional Socialism, just as two decades earlier, Russian students had joined the Bolsheviks. 
Stepun was so upset with the political situation in Dresden that he pulled aside a student 
leader and spoke to him candidly about the dangers Nazism presented to freedom of con-
science and about “anti-Semitism as a sin of the Christian world”60.
In March 1935, Stepun wrote Tillich that he had now decided to join the fight of the 
Confessing Church against National Socialism and against the “philistinism” of capitalism 
and socialism. He sought to make contacts between “religious (Christian), freedom-lov-
ing (creative) socialists of the world to do battle against the demonism and philistinism 
engulfing us.” Concretely, he strove to link “genuine religious socialism” of sort repre-
sented by his journal Novyi grad, and the “religious secularism” represented by Jacques 
Maritain61. Although Stepun enjoyed a certain freedom of maneuver — he claimed he 
could “speak freely with decent people” — he noted that by 1935 “Jews have been relatively 
isolated”62.
The difficult political and religious climate fostered by the National Socialists’ seizure 
of power constituted the background for Stepun’s religious-political program of 1933–
1934. In a two-part article, he argued that both the Bolsheviks and the Nazis were waging a 
social war against Christianity — the Bolsheviks by shooting priests and closing churches, 
and the Nazis by fostering a surrogate faith, which he called a “brown-shirted soldiers’ 
Christianity”63. In view of this dual assault, he asserted, neither Roman Catholic nor Prot-
55 Ibid. P. 10.
56 Ibid. P. 13–14.
57 Ibid. P. 17–18.
58 Ibid. P. 19.
59 Ibid. P. 20–21.
60 Perepiska Fedora Stepuna i Paulia Tillikha. 1. Tsirkular (Rundbrief) Fedor Stepuna [1934] // Fedor 
Stepun. Pis’ma / ed by V. K. Kantor. Moscow, 2013. P. 200–202.
61 Perepiska Fedora Stepuna i Paulia Tillikha. 2. Pis’mo 27 marta 1935 g. // Ibid. P. 211, 213.
62 Ibid. P. 216.
63 Stepun F. Khristianstvo i politika // Sovremennye zapiski. 1933. Vol. LIII. P. 335–352.
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estant attitudes toward Christian politics were sensible. Catholics had oriented themselves 
toward Aquinas’ theocracy, but the practical result of their thinking had been a “profound 
conservatism” of the sort that had led the head of the Center Party, Heinrich Brüning, 
to make a tactical alliance with Hitler64. Most Protestants, with their conviction that all 
worldly authority comes from God, had proven to be political opportunists willing to sup-
port National Socialism65. Stepun saw in the Orthodox Church a better historical path, a 
proper model for the political order. He admired the sixteenth-century Volga elders for 
their blunt criticisms of Muscovite political tyranny and for their quiet refusal to sanction 
the violent suppression of alleged heretics66. He praised Metropolitan Filipp for opposing 
Ivan IV’s oprichnina, Vladimir Solov’ev for opposing the execution of Tsar Aleksandr II’s 
assassins, and Patriarch Tikhon for prophetically criticizing the Bolsheviks67. Stepun saw 
the Optina Pustin’ monastery’s effort to engage the world without becoming part of it as a 
way forward for a Church seeking autonomy from the state, for preaching righteousness 
in politics, and for retaining a “mystical link with popular/national culture”68. Stepun re-
fused to accept Carl Schmitt’s reduction of politics to hatred of the “enemy,” even if con-
temporary Europe was full of precisely such hatred69, and even if most Christians followed 
Schmitt’s idea that Christian belief need not entail pacifism70. Instead, Stepun demanded 
that Christians support a “free spiritual life,” that they oppose social oppression, and that 
they reject the temptation of self-righteousness in politics71.
In Stepun’s opinion, Christianity is a “profoundly peace-loving and definitely anti-na-
tionalistic religion,” yet it permits Christians to shed blood in self-defense and therefore 
cannot be considered pacifistic72. Furthermore, as Stepun defined it, Christianity is a be-
lief system that recognizes both evil’s existence in the world and the imperative to struggle 
against it. In this sense, he thought, Christians are realists. Because fighting evil often 
requires taking the lives of malefactors, and because killing is an act Christians regard as 
sinful, Stepun described the Christian faith as “tragic”. In pondering the tragic nature of 
Christianity, he argued that the sinfulness involved in the struggle against evil and in the 
Christian duty to take moral responsibility for evil, wherever it occurs, forces Christians to 
transform “inhuman evil into human sin”73. Stepun wanted Christians to grasp that state 
violence in wartime, like state executions of criminals in peacetime, can never be consid-
ered good. Instead, state violence must be classified as tragically sinful.
Stepun rejected as a pernicious lie the notion that Christians should ignore their duty 
to protest in the face of actions or movements that seemed historically “inevitable.” He did 
not dispute that recent events in Nazi Germany had unfolded in a manner that seemed 
to many Germans to be ineluctable, but he thought that, even if one granted the assump-
tion that Germany had a certain “destiny” or “fate,” Christians in Germany still could not 
64 Ibid. P. 337.
65 Ibid. P. 338–340.
66 Ibid. P. 341–342.
67 Ibid. P. 342.
68 Ibid. P. 343.
69 Ibid. P. 344–346.
70 Ibid. P. 347–348.
71 Ibid. P. 349–352.
72 Ibid. Vol. LV. P. 308.
73 Ibid. P. 310–311.
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escape responsibility for this fatum74. In the end, he held that Christians should “warn” 
the state against immoral acts and should protest against them, and thus should exercise a 
“powerless authority” [bezvlastnoe vlastvovanie] over the state75. His “program” therefore 
was ethical and “supra-political”: it could not be translated into a set of political axioms, 
into a conventional political platform, or even into a conventional set of normative polit-
ical behaviors76. In Stepun’s opinion, it was perhaps a mistaken enterprise even to speak 
of “Christian politics,” when the emphasis should instead be on the contingent ethical and 
political posture of individual Christians. He advocated this contingent, ethical approach 
to politics as a “healthy” antidote to political dogmatism and utopianism, to the “violent 
ideological tendency” of contemporary politics77.
In short, Stepun rejected the naïve liberalism of the nineteenth century and the 
“ideo cracy” of contemporary Europe (Bolshevism, Nazism, fascism). He upheld instead 
Christian “truth.” He regarded the great Christian tradition as Europe’s only hope, and the 
“small deeds” of individual Christians as the foundation for that hope. He did not deny 
the difficulties in overcoming Bolshevism, Nazism and fascism, but he nevertheless pro-
claimed: “All roads leading to truth travel the abyss’s edge”78.
In June 1937, the Dresden authorities dismissed Stepun from the civil service and 
from his teaching post at the Technische Hochschule79. They also imposed upon him a 
prohibition on public lecturing and on publication80 that remained in force till the end 
of World War II. Stepun took advantage of his forced retirement to write memoirs of his 
activity in Russia before and during the revolution. During the war period, he became a 
political symbol in the Russian diaspora of opposition to the political evils of the twentieth 
century.
It is likely that in Prague in the 1920s, Leontovitsch read Stepun’s Thoughts on Russia, 
and in the 1930s his Letters from Germany. Both those epistolary cycles appeared in the 
leading “fat” journal of the Russian emigration, Sovremennye zapiski, a journal in which 
many of Leontovitsch’s teachers also published. Even if Leontovitsch had not followed the 
journal itself, he could not have avoided conversations among Russians about its contents. 
Starting in 1931, Stepun also published in the journal Novyi grad81. That journal’s Chris-
tian philosophical orientation would have attracted Leontovitsch as a practicing Russian 
Orthodox and as a Church historian. Leontovitsch shared certain elements of Stepun’s 
Christian outlook: his hostility to nationalism, his anti-utopianism, his moralism. Like 
Stepun, Leontovitsch opposed Bolshevism and National Socialism. Again, like Stepun, 
Leontovitsch saw recent Russian and Germany history as tragic. These points of symme-
74 Ibid. P. 312.
75 Ibid. P. 314.
76 Ibid. P. 315–316.
77 Ibid. P. 320.
78 Ibid. P. 325.
79 Hufen C. Fedor Stepun… S. 494.
80 Ibid. P. 507.
81 Novyi grad appeared in Paris from 1931 to 1939, under the editorship of I. Bunakov [pseudonym 
for Il’ia Isidorovich Fondaminskii], Georgii Petrovich Fedotov and Stepun. The editorial board considered 
it a philosophical journal written from a Christian perspective. Fourteen issues were published. For a bibli-
ography of articles published there, and in other major publication of writers in the Russian diaspora, see: 
L’Émigration russe. Revues et recueils, 1920–1980: index général des articles / éds T. L. Gladkova, T. A. Os-
orgina. Paris, 1988.
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try between Stepun and Leontovitsch bespeak either Stepun’s influence on Leontovitsch, 
or certain “parallels” in their intellectual evolution from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s.
We do not know when Leontovitsch met Stepun. Their extant personal correspon-
dence began in late summer 1944. In a letter dated 15 August of that year, Leontovitsch 
referred to a meeting with Stepun three months earlier (in May), and proposed a future 
meeting “continuing our dialogues”82. This remark suggests two possibilities: either a con-
tinuation of a personal relationship that began in May 1944, or continuation of dialogues 
that had commenced even before then. Leontovitsch’s daughter Julia Oswalt recalled that 
Stepun visited her family several times after the war’s end. She testified that Stepun wore 
“a much too large, broad-brimmed hat” and a “capacious coat” that “seemed to harbor his 
all-embracing thoughts.” She described Stepun’s relationship with Victor Leontovitsch as 
“not untroubled,” but she also testified that the friendship was close enough for Leonto-
vitsch to have borrowed money from Stepun83. 
IV
Leontovitsch’s main scholarly activity during the war was preparation of his Habil-
itationsschrift on the “legal revolution” wrought by Ivan the Terrible84. We do not know 
when Leontovitsch began thinking about Ivan as a historical figure, but a fragmentary 
autobiography suggests the process may have commenced well before 1917, when he sat 
for hours in grandfather Lesevich’s library. “Among the [great] historical personalities,” he 
wrote, “there were none to whom I felt particular attraction, but there were some whom 
I  thought especially unattractive, such as Ivan the Terrible”85. Later, while in Paris pre-
paring for his master’s examination in Church history, Leontovitsch read widely on the 
history of the Orthodox Church in Muscovy and Ukraine86. Among the works on Ivan 
IV’s relationship to the Church, which Leontovitsch studied, were Evgenii Evstignevich 
Golubinskii’s history of the Russian Church87, Nikolai Fedorovich Kapterev’s analysis of 
the Russian Church hierarchy88, and Ivan Mikhailovich Pokrovskii’s study of Russian bish-
oprics89. Leontovitsch also made a special study of the Stoglav, the 1551 Church coun-
cil, so important in modifying Russian canon law. He focused on regulations governing 
Church courts, regulations that clarified the distinction between ecclesiastical and state 
82 Letter from Victor Leontovitsch to Fedor Stepun, 15  August 1944, l. 2  //  Beinecke Library. Fe-
dor Stepun Papers. Series I. Correspondence: Leontovitsch, Victor 1944–1959. General Manuscripts 172. 
Box 20, folder 682. My gratitude to Yale University’s Beinecke Library for scanning this correspondence, and 
to Parmen Leontovitsch and Julia Oswalt for permission to cite their father’s letters.
83 Oswalt J. Zwischen den Welten… S. 41.
84 See: Leontovitsch V. Die Rechtsumwälzung unter Iwan dem Schrecklichen und die Ideologie der 
russischen Selbstherrschaft. Stuttgart, 1946. The book was finished by 1944, and was presented to the Fac-
ulty of Philosophy at the Johann Wolfgang Göthe University in Frankfurt-am-Main in the winter semester 
of 1946–1947. The manuscript was published in 1946, 1947 and again in 1949.
85 Leontovitsch V. Lebenbeschreibung… P. 1.
86 Kopiia. Otchet o rabote (s 1-go iiulia 1930 po 1-oe maia 1931 g.), Viktora Vladimirovicha Leontovi-
cha // Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Fedratsii (GARF). F. 5765. Op. 1. Ed. khr. 4. L. 403–406.
87 Golubinskii E. E. Istoriia russkoi tserkvi. In 2 vols, 4 pts. Moscow, 1901–1911; Leontovitsch would 
have been interested in volume 2.
88 Kapterev N. F. Svetskie arkhereiskie chinovniki drevnei Rusi. Moscow, 1874.
89 Pokrovskii I. M. Russkie eparkhii v XVI–XVII vv., ikh otkrytie, sostav i predely: opyt tserkovno-is-
toricheskago, statisticheskago i geograficheskago izsledovaniia. Kazan’, 1897.
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jurisdictions90. In analyzing these scholarly works, Leontovitsch must have thought hard 
about Ivan IV’s contribution to Russian law. 
At any rate, Leontovitsch finished his thesis in 1944, then defended it in 1947. His 
book was probably inspired by the Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin’s work on the transforma-
tion of Russia from a decentralized network of principalities and city-states under private 
law to a modern bureaucratic state governed by universally applicable statutory law91. Le-
ontovitsch held that objective law before Ivan IV “lacked the significance it came to have 
in the modern age”92. Under the allodial princes, the normative demands on individuals 
were often contradictory, such that individuals understood law as the “sum” of conflicting 
demands, or rather as a set of incoherent customary expectations. During Ivan IV’s ab-
solutist regime, the importance of custom diminished, because individuals now began to 
experience “the dominance of objective law” mandated by an “unlimited government”93.
According to Leontovitsch, in the epoch preceding Ivan, the main sources of Russian 
law were: agreements negotiated by allodial princes, or between princes and urban assem-
blies [vecha]94; directives by individual princes aimed at their subjects95; folk customs96; 
and religious beliefs97. Leontovitsch maintained that each of these normative sources had 
limitations: the effect of negotiated agreements usually did not extend beyond the signa-
tories’ jurisdictions; decrees had purely local significance; folkways and religious ideas 
conditioned popular behavior, but they did not constitute law per se. Leontovitsch agreed 
with Mikhail Aleksandrovich Diakonov that religious belief was an especially problematic 
source of law, since Orthodox Christians tended to link sovereign political authority not 
to political power under law but rather to the exercise of personal virtue98. Thus, before 
Ivan IV, Russian law had what Leontovitsch called a “subjective character”: it was binding 
on individuals, or on local groups, or on the virtuous, but it lacked the “objective char-
acter” of universally enforceable statutes. Under Ivan IV, an “undivided sovereign” issued 
laws binding on all subjects. Ivan therefore established in Muscovy an “objective legal 
order”99.
According to Leontovitsch, Ivan IV considered it an absolute imperative for Musco-
vites to obey him: no “subjective” rule, no subjective impulse could stand as obstacle to 
this duty. Indeed, Ivan thought, God alone stood between tsar and his subjects100. Nor did 
Ivan regard subjects’ obedience to the tsar as a personal matter: in his thinking, obedi-
ence flowed from sovereignty. Ivan recognized only one exception to the duty to obey — 
90 Leontovitsch took a seminar from Anton Vladimirovich Kartashev on the Muscovite court system 
as outlined in chapters 67–69 of the Stoglav. As background, he read Vladimirovskii-Budanov M. F. Obzor 
istorii russkago prava. St. Petersburg; Kiev, 1888, and Beliaev I. D. Lektsii po istorii russkago zakonodatel’st-
va. Moscow, 1879, and Father Dmitrii (Stefanovich)’s dissertation: Stefanovich D. O Stoglave: Ego proisk-
hozhdenie, redaktsii i sostav: k istorii pamiatnikov drevnerusskago tserkovnago prava. St. Petersburg, 1909. 
91 See: Chicherin B. N. Oblastnye uchrezhdeniia Rossii v XVII-m veke. Moscow, 1856.
92 Leontovitsch V. V. Die Rechtsumwälzung… S. 8–9.
93 Ibid. S. 10.
94 Ibid. S. 11.
95 Ibid. S. 13–15.
96 Ibid. S. 16–17.
97 Ibid. S. 17–20.
98 Ibid. S. 21–22.
99 Ibid. S. 22. — Here Leontovitsch disagreed with Chicherin, who had treated Peter the Great as the 
great legal system-maker.
100 Ibid. S. 26.
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namely, a case where the tsar had violated the Orthodox faith. But because Ivan thought 
of himself as acting consistently with Orthodoxy in all circumstances, there could be no 
practical justification for Muscovites to resist his will101: the tsar did not acknowledge the 
legitimacy of any political authority in Muscovy other than himself102. Indeed, according 
to Ivan, only the tsar had the right to enforce statutory law, for God had given that right 
exclusively to him103 and with the duty to enforce law came the responsibility to fight 
godlessness in the realm104.
According to Leontovitsch, Ivan discussed the tsar’s absolute sovereignty against the 
background of Muscovy’s failure to prosper under divided aristocratic government105. In 
fact, he associated aristocratic rule with “fratricidal conflicts”106. Ivan also asserted that, 
as the case of Poland had demonstrated, divided government is inferior to autocracy. 
The tsar rejected government by priests, citing the fall of biblical Israel and of Ortho-
dox Byzan tium as examples of ruinous clerical rule107. According to Leontovitsch, Ivan 
conceded that priests perform important services in Orthodox realms, but Ivan warned 
against confusing priestly duties with the tsar’s responsibility to act as principal defender 
of the faith through enforcement of the laws and through prohibitions on evil conduct108.
Ivan justified his authority as tsar partly by appealing to Orthodox Christian teaching 
concerning royal power, yet his reference to Christian teaching had led historians of Rus-
sian politics, such as Diakonov and Fedotov, to wonder whether Ivan had departed from 
Orthodox teaching. Diakonov had contended that Ivan had introduced “nothing new to 
this [Christian] theory [of the state],” whereas Fedotov had classified Ivan’s political theory 
as a clear deviation from Orthodoxy109. In this dispute, Leontovitsch sided with Diakonov 
against Fedotov. According to Leontovitsch, the main disagreement between Ivan and 
Metropolitan Filipp over the exercise of royal authority focused on the oprichnina. Filipp 
disputed the tsar’s ethical choice in using the oprichniki to destroy the tsar’s imagined op-
ponents but not the royal prerogative to establish such an institutional entity110. 
Leontovitsch also disagreed with Fedotov’s assessment of Prince Andrei Kurbskii — 
namely, with Fedotov’s view that Kurbskii had departed from typical Muscovite think-
ing about the state. According to Leontovitsch, Kurbskii upheld the Muscovite view of 
the realm as “the homeland of Orthodox Christianity,” and of the tsar as religious leader 
charged with the care of Muscovites’ souls. Kurbskii criticized Ivan for failing to defend 
the Orthodox realm, for acting as an “inner enemy” of the Church, and for violating good 
conscience — that is, for failing to act as loyal Muscovites expected a just ruler to be-
have111. In Leontovitsch’s opinion, “Kurbskii represented the same ideology as Tsar Ivan 
and as most other thinkers of the age.” The difference between Ivan and Kurbskii was that 
the prince concentrated not on the tsar’s prerogatives as ruler, but rather on Ivan’s fail-
101 Ibid. S. 28–29.
102 Ibid. S. 29.
103 Ibid. S. 31–32.
104 Ibid. S. 35.
105 Ibid. S. 36–37.
106 Ibid. S. 37.
107 Ibid. S. 38.
108 Ibid. S. 40–41.
109 Ibid. S. 44–46.
110 Ibid. S. 49–51.
111 Ibid. S. 51–56.
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ure to fulfill his royal duties112. According to Kurbskii, Ivan should have heeded his wise 
counselors’’ advice, but did not do so113; the tsar had also failed in his duty to try disgraced 
advisors, including those suspected of treason, according to established rules and taking 
into account their status as high priests and as members of the aristocracy114; neither had 
the tsar respected the property of Russian aristocrats115. However, according to Leonto-
vitsch, Kurbskii was well aware that the tsar had no legal obligation to heed counselors’ 
advice, no legal obligation to try disgraced advisors according to customary methods, and 
no enforceable legal duty to respect aristocrats’ property.
Leontovitsch maintained that the ideology upheld by Ivan and the tsar’s chief critics 
(Metropolitan Filipp, Prince Kurbskii), was rooted in the all-encompassing thinking of 
Iosif Volotskii, who had “left to [Muscovite] subjects no autonomy, no sphere of personal 
rights”116. According to Leontovitsch, Iosif ’s central teaching — that royal power comes 
from God — probably reached Ivan in early childhood, most likely from the lips of his 
father Grand Duke Vasilii117. Leontovitsch called this ideology “theocratic absolutism”118.
In chapter three of his book, Leontovitsch addressed the debate between those his-
torians who had attributed the oprichnina to Ivan’s irrationality or “madness,” and those 
scholars who had treated the oprichnina as a response to changing historical conditions. 
Leontovitsch argued that Ivan was a political “rationalist,” that the tsar’s political theory 
and state system were based on a series of deductions from the “ideology” of theocratic 
absolutism, and thus that the terror imposed during the oprichnina flowed from the tsar’s 
political principles. Leontovitsch did not deny that, when Ivan ordered the death of politi-
cal opponents, the tsar acted “with cold heart,” or even sadistically; however, the historian 
insisted that “an ideological justification must rest at the heart of any system of terror, for, 
without an ideological underpinning, a system of terror — a planned, prolonged applica-
tion of terror aimed at entire groups in the population — would be unthinkable”119. Of 
course, Ivan’s psychological make-up — his childhood hatred of the boyars, his sadistic 
impulses — played a role in initiating and executing the terror120, but more important was 
the link between this psychology and the tsar’s ideological assumptions. The tsar imag-
ined Muscovy as an “ideal kingdom”121, and pictured active and passive opponents of this 
ideal kingdom as “adversaries of righteousness”122. 
In sketching the connection between terror and ideology, Leontovitsch admitted the 
influence of Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii’s Kurs russkoi istoriii, the second volume of 
which discussed the oprichnina by linking Ivan’s psyche and youthful political outlook123. 
However, the most striking influence on Leontovitsch seems to have been volume five 
of Hippolyte Taine’s Les origines de la France contemporaine, which, according to Leon-
tovitsch, attempted to derive the Jacobins’ psychology from their radical political views, 
112 Ibid. S. 55–56.
113 Ibid. S. 56–58.
114 Ibid. S. 58–63.
115 Ibid. S. 63–64.
116 Ibid. S. 66.
117 Ibid. S. 68–70.
118 Ibid. S. 70.
119 Ibid. S. 79–80.
120 Ibid. S. 80.
121 Ibid. S. 81–82.
122 Ibid. S. 82–83.
123 Ibid. S. 72–85
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not the reverse124. According to Taine, the Jacobins had identified themselves with virtue 
and had asserted that virtue cannot be opposed “without crime”; in Taine’s opinion, the 
Jacobins therefore took it upon themselves to suppress unvirtuous “malefactors” by all 
necessary means125. In implementing their program, Taine maintained, the Jacobins drew 
justification from “an axiom of political geometry which constituted its own proof.” The 
Jacobins did not see their opponents as “real human beings”: “[The revolution] did not 
see them; it had no need to see them; with eyes closed, it ground this human material into 
dust”126.
In Leontovitsch’s opinion, Ivan IV was a kind of Jacobin avant la lettre. What distin-
guished Ivan from his contemporaries was not his theocratic absolutism per se, but rather 
his will to impose that ideology on the country. According to Leontovitsch, “Ivan was 
consequent, others were not. He wanted to incorporate the idea into reality rigorously 
and uncompromisingly, while others confined themselves to judging existing reality on 
the basis of ideology”127. Ivan upheld a theology of autocratic sovereignty, just as Jacobins 
fashioned an ideology of revolutionary sovereignty. In Taine’s formulation, Ivan trans-
formed himself in a fashion resembling “the way a theologian becomes an inquisitor”128.
If the tsar’s ideological views never changed, what accounted for the different periods 
of his reign? According to Leontovitsch, “the tsar didn’t change, but the milieu in which 
he worked did; the tsar’s politics didn’t change, but the reaction of this milieu did”129. 
Ivan’s opponents, such as Metropolitan Filipp and Prince Kurbskii, shared his political 
assumptions, and therefore they could offer only moral objections to his methods of ab-
solute rule. Leontovitsch compared the fecklessness of the clerical-aristocratic opposition 
to the “helplessness” of the modern bourgeoisie in its encounter with socialism130. As the 
tsar’s critics pressed their case against his “pride and fanaticism,” Ivan’s determination to 
have his way intensified. To capture this turn, Leontovitsch quoted Mikhail Osipovich 
Gershenzon’s description of the Russian-intellectual-turned-Catholic-priest, Vladimir 
Sergeevich Pechorin: “The closer he [Pechorin] came to his ideal, the crueler his heart 
grew”131.
Leontovitsch contended that, over time, as Ivan’s anti-aristocratic impulse more deep-
ly impacted Muscovite politics, the aristocrats’ opposition sharpened. In effect, Leonto-
vitsch argued, there occurred a dialectical process in which criticism of the tsar led him to 
greater cruelties, and these “fanatical” methods of rule further reinforced the opposition 
to him. As a consequence, the old “subjective” notions of aristocratic rights vanished into 
the air, and a new “objective” order based on state service took shape132.
Leontovitsch traced the tsar’s anti-aristocratic thinking to early moments in his reign: 
to Adashev’s advice “never to fear the strong and the titled”133; to Ivan’s efforts at the Sto-
124 Ibid. S. 72. fn. 1.
125 Ibid. S. 83. fn. 1. See: Taine H. Les origines de la France contemporaine. 27 éd. Vol. 5. Paris, 1911. 
P. 36. 
126 Leontovitsch V. V. Die Rechtsumwälzung… S. 85, fn. 2; Taine H. Les origines… P. 23. 
127 Leontovitsch V. V. Die Rechtsumwälzung… S. 86.
128 Ibid. S. 87; Taine H. Les origines… Vol. 5. P. 37.
129 Leontovitsch V. V. Die Rechtsumwälzung… S. 89.
130 Ibid. S. 90.
131 Ibid. S. 93; Gershenzon M. Zhizn’ M. S. Pechorina. Moscow, 1910. P. 105.
132 Leontovitsch V. V. Die Rechtsumwälzung… S. 95–96.
133 Ibid. S. 99.
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glav council to support the poor, the elderly and victims of war134; to Ivan’s candid decla-
ration that, in his childhood, boyars had tried to wield power in their own interest135; to 
Ivan’s decision to limit the principle of mestnichestvo in staffing the army136. Ivan reduced 
the boyars’ influence in the state apparatus and the army, “while leaving the private inter-
ests of the boyars more or less undisturbed”137.
On 20 September 1556, however, Ivan ordered every possessor of hereditary landed 
property to supply a horse to the army for each hundred cheti of arable land in his pos-
session. According to Leontovitsch, the 1556 decree flowed directly from the tsar’s com-
mitment to defend his subjects against external aggression, and therefore it rested on a 
bedrock ideological principle of theocratic absolutism138. Because the decree encumbered 
the boyars’ landed estates [votchiny] in unprecedented fashion and therefore undermined 
their “subjective” rights as a group immune from taxation, it constituted the beginning of 
a new social order in Muscovy139, an order that “degraded” boyars to the level of the ser-
vice nobility. Most boyars regarded the decree as a challenge to their social pre-eminence, 
and thus, following Kurbskii’s example, they intensified their opposition to Ivan. They 
called at court for the revocation of the “unbearable” 1556 decree140.
Leontovitsch noted that Ivan had issued the decree at a pivotal military junction — 
just after the sacking of Astrakhan and after the army’s devastation of the Tatar Horde: at 
this moment, the boyars could not easily prey on popular discontent with the victorious 
tsar. Leontovitsch wrote that, “On this occasion as well, a despotic leader used an external 
threat to undercut his subjects’ rights”141. This remark linking war, despotism and assaults 
on civil rights was probably an oblique reference to the Russian revolution and to Nazi 
Germany.
Leontovitsch contended that the tsar’s attempt to enforce the 1556 decree “entailed 
fundamental difficulties that led ultimately to the establishment of the oprichnina”142. In 
Leontovitsch’s telling, the oprichnina was an attempt, by means of state terror, to resettle 
small-holding service nobles on boyars’ confiscated lands, but it was also a social war 
against the boyars, even against those who had obeyed the 1556 decree. In Leontovitsch’s 
opinion, therefore, the oprichnina was a “genuine revolution”; an attempt by the tsar to 
establish a “new, ideal, objective social order”; a social transformation in which Ivan made 
use of previously marginal people now hungry to seize opportunities the state offered 
them143. Leontovitsch quoted Hauriou’s comment on the fate of religious reformers who 
had announced a “beautiful sounding program” only to find themselves surrounded by 
confidence men and thieves, and to witness their splendid plans degenerating into some-
thing “mediocre, awful and lamentable”144.
134 Ibid. S. 99–101.
135 Ibid. S. 101–102.
136 Ibid. S. 102–103.
137 Ibid. S. 104.
138 Ibid. S. 106–109.
139 Ibid. S. 106–107.
140 Ibid. S. 109–110.
141 Ibid. S. 110.
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143 Ibid. S. 114.
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Leontovitsch interpreted the oprichnina not as an unsuccessful attempt to restore the 
best features of the Kievan federation with its service-based property arrangements, but as 
a successful revolution that laid foundations for the serf system, which dominated Russia’s 
future until 1861145. According to this interpretation, the establishment of state service in 
1556 as a prerequisite for use of landed property led, in the next decades, to fixing peasants 
on the land: in other words, the spread of the pomestie system among the social elites was 
the logical first step toward the nadel system, which gave peasants use of pomestie land 
contingent on payment of dues or performance of duties. In the process of this develop-
ment, Leontovitsch suggested, uncontingent ownership of property virtually disappeared 
in Russia. In his terms, “consequently, the abolition of the titled aristocrats’ private landed 
property led swiftly to the general abolition of landed property [in Muscovy]”146. 
Leontovitsch held that the serf system did not appear accidentally, but rather as a 
result of the “rationalizing tendency” stemming from Ivan’s determination to subordinate 
all his subjects to the state and to transform material goods into instruments of state con-
trol147. In Leontovitsch’s opinion, Ivan IV had laid the foundation for subsequent centuries 
of Russian history. The tsar’s “binding” [prikreplenie] of Russian nobles to state service and 
of peasants to the land in the sixteenth century triggered centuries later a countervailing 
process — the “unbinding” [raskreposchchenie] of society and peasantry from their obli-
gations. Leontovitsch asserted that the “unbinding” of individuals’ obligations was “the 
essence of Russian liberalism.” He also linked the serf system to the rise of Russian social-
ism148. Thus, all of Russia’s subsequent history stemmed from Ivan’s ideological assump-
tions and from his “relentless, fanatically impatient, uneasy spirit”149.
Was Leontovitsch’s book a reaction against the official Soviet tendency in the 1930s 
and early 1940s to idealize Ivan IV? 
Maureen Perrie has noted that, by the mid-1930s, Soviet cultural authorities had be-
gun to turn against earlier interpretations of history emphasizing tsarist oppression and 
the wickedness of Russian foreign policy: the perceived need to foster patriotism to hold 
the populace together in case of war now led to “a reversion to older approaches to histo-
ry, which emphasized the role of individual ‘great men’ as national heroes”150. Perrie has 
argued that the new interpretive scheme celebrating great patriots emerged gradually. At 
first, in the mid-1930s, cultural leaders constructed heroic analogies between efforts of 
earlier Russian patriots to resist foreign invaders, and efforts by the Soviet government to 
ready the workers’ state to fight the country’s enemies in Europe and Asia. Later, in the 
winter 1940–1941, the campaign to find historical analogues for Soviet patriotism reached 
a new stage: at Stalin’s initiative, high Soviet officials commissioned various creative works 
treating Ivan IV as a strong, wise patriotic leader. Among the prominent new works on 
Ivan were the novelistic trilogy Ivan Groznyi by Valentin Ivanovich Kostylev, the play Ivan 
Groznyi by Aleksei Nikolaevich Tolstoi, and the monumental films under the same name 
145 Leontovitsch V. V. Die Rechtsumwälzung… S. 115–116.
146 Ibid. S. 117–118.
147 Ibid. S. 118.
148 Ibid. S. 120.
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150 Perrie M. The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia. Houndmills, Basingstroke, Hampshire, 
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by Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenshtein151. The authorities expected the new works to show 
Ivan as “people’s tsar” aligned with peasants and other commoners against treacherous 
boyars. By highlighting the historical necessity to defend the state against external and 
internal foes, the new work was supposed to justify the oprichnina. It is easy to see how 
such a flattering portrait of Ivan supported Stalin’s iron rule, the purges of the late 1930s, 
and Soviet absorption of the Baltic states after 1939. Perrie has rightly classified the tsar’s 
rehabilitation as “the Stalinization of Ivan the Terrible”152.
It is unlikely, however, that the Soviet rehabilitation of Ivan IV had a direct impact on 
Leontovitsch’s view of his subject. Kostylev’s novel appeared in installments from 1944 to 
1947, and Tolstoi’s play was staged only in 1944 — that is, long after Leontovitsch had 
started writing his book. The first part of Eisenshtein’s film Ivan Groznyi premiered only 
in January 1945; the second part, which dealt with the oprichnina, was not released un-
til 1958153. It is conceivable, of course, that news of the official campaign to rehabilitate 
Ivan IV reached Leontovitsch in March 1941, when he might have read Kostylev’s arti-
cle on Ivan in Izvestiia154. Leontovitsch may also have caught the drift of official Soviet 
thinking on Ivan even earlier, from V. G. Verkhoven’’s 1939 essay, Russia in the Age of Ivan 
Groznyi, which stressed the impact of the boyar “treason” against the crown155. But the 
evidence in Leontovitsch’s book on Ivan suggests that he reacted not to the Soviet “Stalini-
zation of Ivan the Terrible,” but rather to two earlier “waves” of scholarship on Ivan.
A major impact on Leontovitsch’s thinking about Ivan probably came from scholar-
ship in the half-century from 1880 to 1930. Leontovitsch closely studied Mikhail Aleksan-
drovich Diakonov’s 1889 essay on political ideas in Old Russia, a book which underlined 
the importance of Ivan IV’s emphasis on the tsar’s sacred authority inside Muscovy and 
also outside it, amongst Christian rulers156. Leontovitsch must have been familiar with 
Sergei Fedorovich Platonov’s 1899 essays on the Time of Troubles, essays which under-
scored long-term developments making Muscovite grand dukes into “popular/national 
leaders” [narodnye vozhdi], and which stressed the tension between the boyars and the 
crown157. Platonov described the oprichnina as a “political coup” [gosudarstvennyi perev-
orot] against the boyars158 — a view Leontovitsch came to share — but also as an attempt 
151 Kostylev V. I.: 1) Ivan Groznyi (Moskva v pokhode). Moscow, 1944; 2) Ivan Groznyi (More). Mos-
cow, 1945; 3) Ivan Groznyi (Nevskaia tverdynia). Moscow, 1947. For Tolstoi’s play, see: Tolstoi A. N. Ivan 
Groznyi. Dramaticheskaia povest’ v dvukh chast’iakh. Moscow, 1944. 
152 Perrie M. The Cult… P. 77–178.
153 The Soviet Artistic Council viewed Eisenshtein’s original cut of Ivan Groznyi, Part Two, in Feb-
ruary 1946, but blocked its public release. On 24 February 1947, Eisenshtein and the actor Nikolai Kon-
stantinovich Cherkasov, who played Ivan in the films, met Stalin, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov and 
Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov in the Kremlin to discuss possible changes in the film, but Eisenshtein did 
not manage to complete the editing before his death in February 1948. See: Perrie M. The Cult… P. 170–178; 
Mar’iamov G. B. Kremlevskii tsenzor (Stalin smotrit kino). Moscow, 1992. P. 84–92, gives a text of the con-
versation between Eisenshtein and Stalin. For the production history of the film, see: Neuberger J. Ivan the 
Terrible. London; New York, 2003. P. 13–24.
154 Kostylev V. I. Literaturnye zametki // Izvestiia. 1941. 19 March. P. 4.
155 Perrie M. The Cult… P. 81–82; Verkhoven’ V. G. Rossiia v tsarstvovanie Ivana Groznogo. Moscow, 
1939. According to Perrie, Verkhoven’’s essay was published in a mass edition of 100,000 copies.
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“to undermine everything in the state that supported aristocratic landholding”159. In a 
sense, Platonov anticipated Leontovitsch’s contention that Ivan sought to obliterate private 
or “subjective” law by destroying its source — local principalities160. Platonov made the 
argument that the oprichnina, by driving peasants out of their homes near Moscow, even-
tually prompted the state to try to “fix” peasants to the land161. Platonov repeated his main 
interpretive claims about Ivan in his 1924 biography of the tsar162, a book Leontovitsch 
cited several times in his study of Ivan IV. Diakonov also repeated Platonov’s ideas on the 
peasantry in his 1904 book on the political and social structure of Old Russia163, a volume 
Leontovitsch would likely have known but did not cite in his book on Ivan IV. 
Another key interpretation of Ivan IV came from Robert Iur’evich Vipper’s 1922 bio-
graphical essay Ivan Groznyi164, which classified Ivan as a military monarch trying to 
overcome the fragmentation of aristocratic principalities165 and to build in their place 
a unitary state166. Vipper used the term “autocratic-communist” to describe the pivot-
al 1556 reforms167. As Perrie has noted, the medievalist Ivan Ivanovich Polosin adopted 
Vipper’s term when he compared Ivan’s “revolution” to the events of 1917168. It is not 
clear whether Leontovitsch read Vipper’s book or Polosin’s discussion of the oprichnina 
by Heinrich von Staden; if he did, consulting these books may have prompted him to 
conclude that Ivan’s economic policy anticipated Soviet “absolutism.” In any case, we know 
from two sources that Leontovitsch was familiar with Vipper’s and Polosin’s arguments169.
A crucial reference for Leontovitsch was Georgii Petrovich Fedotov’s 1928 book on 
the Metropolitan Filipp170. In it, Fedotov highlighted the bloody confrontation between 
Ivan and Filipp, a confrontation that proved to Fedotov’s satisfaction that the oprichnina 
was tyrannical. Fedotov maintained that Ivan’s policies, whatever their secular justifica-
tions, were “immoral.” In fact, the policies were manifestations of Ivan’s psychological “ab-
normality” [nenormal’nost’]. The historian also pointed out that, from the Russian nation-
alist perspective, the oprichnina was a disaster, because it contributed to Muscovy’s defeat 
in the Livonian war. In a sense, Fedotov’s moralistic reading of Ivan’s reign constituted a 
return to Karamzin’s early nineteenth-century understanding of Ivan as a tyrant. As we 
159 Ibid. P. 142–143.
160 Ibid. P. 147–148.
161 Ibid. P. 158.
162 Platonov S. F. Ivan Groznyi. Berlin, 1924.
163 Diakonov M. A. Ocherki obshchestvennago i gosudarstvennago stroia drevnei Rusi. 2nd ed. St. Pe-
tersburg, 1908. P. 343–348.
164 Vipper R. I. Ivan Groznyi. Moscow, 1922.
165 Ibid. P. 103–131; see the intelligent remarks on Vipper’s book by: Perrie M. The Cult… P. 12–13.
166 Ibid. P. 13–14.
167 Vipper R. I. Ivan Groznyi. P. 138.
168 Polosin called Ivan’s domestic policy “military-autocratic communism” [voenno-samoderzhavnyi 
kommunizm]. See: Polosin I. I. Zapadnaya Evropa i Moscovija v XVI veke // Shtaden G. O Moskve Ivana 
Groznogo. Zapiski nemtsa oprichnika /  ed. by I. I. Polosin. Leningrad, 1925. P. 40; Perrie M. The Cult… 
P. 16–17.
169 Leontovitsch’s bibliography for Die Rechtsumwälzung unter Iwan der Schrecklichen referred neither 
to Vipper nor to Polosin’s 1925 edition of Heinrich von Staaden. Leontovitsch would have known of Vip-
per’s book and interpretation from Platonov’s Ivan Groznyi, which commented on Vipper. For von Staaden, 
Leontovitsch used the 1930 German edition: Staaden H. von. Aufzeichnungen über den Moskauer Staat: 
nach der Handrschrift des Preussischen Staatsarchivs in Hannover / Hrsg. von F. Epstein. Hamburg, 1930. 
However, Leontovitsch would have known of Polosin’s interpretation of Ivan IV from the historiographical 
“excursus” at the end of Fedotov’s book on the Metropolitan Filipp (see citation below).
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have seen, Leontovitsch registered Fedotov’s opinions on Ivan’s political ruthlessness and 
psychological imbalance, but rejected Fedotov’s suggestion that Ivan’s policies were un-
necessary or irrational.
The earliest influences on Leontovitsch were perhaps the most profound. Aside 
from volumes VIII through X of Karamzin’s History of the Russian State, which labeled 
Ivan a tyrant but validated his centralizing policies, Leontovitsch drew on two mid-nine-
teenth-century historians affiliated with the so-called “juridical school” of historical 
writing: Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin and Sergei Mikhailovich Solov’ev. These historians 
treated Ivan’s reign as a key moment in the construction of a unified Russian state. For 
Leontovitsch’s purpose, Chicherin’s essay on Muscovite charters was emblematic, because 
Chicherin contrasted the “anarchism” of Old Russia with the “order” of the Muscovite 
state after Ivan IV171. Chicherin’s main juridical idea was that the early legal system was 
based on private law promulgated by local princes, whereas from the mid-sixteenth to 
the early eighteenth century, there came into existence a system of public law applying to 
everyone. In his multi-volume history of Russia, Solov’ev treated the oprichnina as regret-
table to the degree that it was a manifestation of armed conflict, but he nevertheless saw 
it as contributing to the central state’s victory over fractious boyars172. In the end, Solov’ev 
thought, Ivan’s policies constituted an administrative “necessity”173.
In passing we should note that the impact upon Leontovitsch of nineteenth-century 
Romantic views of Ivan IV, which emphasized the tsar’s contradictory, multi-sided per-
sonality, is unclear. Natal’ia Nikolaevna Mut’ia has shown that, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Russian writers and artists elaborated on the Romantic vision of the 
tsar to construct an even more complex portrait of Ivan capturing his heroic, quotidian, 
arrogant, democratic, religious and brutal aspects. She has suggested that the tsar’s cruelty, 
when refracted in works of plastic art and theater, “no longer horrified [spectators], but at-
tracted and edified [them]”174. It is possible that, in his Ukrainian childhood, Leontovitsch 
encountered precisely these aestheticized images of Ivan. Leontovitsch may therefore have 
recoiled against Ivan’s legendary cruelty, while at the same time recognizing the tsar’s in-
tellectual consistency. 
In Leontovitsch’s short book on Ivan IV’s “legal revolution,” there is much to criti-
cize: Leontovitsch introduced no new sources to historical scholarship; he misread the 
complicated Iosif Volotskii as a fanatical partisan of Muscovite absolutism; he underesti-
mated the principled differences between Ivan and his chief critics, Kurbskii and Filipp; 
he exaggerated the importance of the 1556 decree as “trigger” for the oprichnina; he erred 
in suggesting that the oprichnina was an attempt to destroy the boyar elite175; he asserted 
but never proved that the peasants’ enserfment was a consequence of the 1556 decree; he 
171 See: Chicherin B. N. Dukhovnyia i dogovornyia gramoty velikikh i udel’nykh kniazei // Obzor isto-
rii russkago prava. Moscow, 1858. P. 232–375.
172 Solov’ev S. M. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen. Kniga vtoraia. Vol. VI–X. St. Petersburg, 1894. 
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174 Mut’ia N. N. Ivan Groznyi. Istorizm i lichnost’ pravitelia v otechestvennom iskusstve XIX–XX vv. 
St. Peterburg, 2010. P. 451.
175 Nancy Kollman has suggested that Leontovitsch could not have written his book after the wave 
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was almost surely mistaken in interpreting the Time of Troubles as “an aristocratic count-
er-revolution” aimed at the undoing of Ivan’s legal revolution176.
At a deeper level, Leontovitsch’s book made a problematic equation between religious 
postulates concerning the tsar’s duties as Christian magistrate and state “ideology,” be-
tween Ivan’s Christian Ideenwelt and the Jacobins’ modern rationalistic and rationalizing 
mentality. No doubt, Leontovitsch’s equation of religion and ideology is suggestive. After 
all, there are functional similarities between religion and ideology: both are cognitive sys-
tems that help individuals to interpret the world, to understand their role in the world, and 
to place normative bounds on individual and collective behavior; both, therefore, shape 
the political order and set the parameters for virtuous political conduct. Because of these 
functional similarities, both religion and ideology “fit” Hauriou’s ideocratic model of state 
power, a model that considers the state’s institutional “personality” a function of its funda-
mental assumptions or “idea.” In Hauriou’s thinking, both religious and ideological men-
talités may accommodate charismatic leadership of the sort Ivan manifested, alongside the 
rationalizing elements of a “revolutionary” worldview like the one Ivan allegedly adopted. 
And yet, religion and ideology are different. Orthodoxy focuses on duties of the mag-
istrate and of his subjects for the sake of their salvation; moreover, in Orthodox thinking, 
virtuous conduct depends on adherence to rules mandated by God. On the other hand, a 
secular ideology advocates the performance of public duties for the sake of mundane ob-
jectives, such as the common good and the defense of the realm against external attack. In 
secular ideological systems, the matter of an individual’s salvation is irrelevant, so long as 
the individual obeys the sovereign authority. Put another way, in secular polities, custom 
and law regulate private and public conduct, but these regulations do not always coincide 
with religious norms governing individual conduct. The difference between religion and 
ideology is both epistemological (that is, they are distinguished by the different sources 
from which political precepts and thus political behaviors derive) and functional (that is, 
religious norms and ideological mandates do not necessarily coincide in substance or in 
effect). The difference may also be historical, insofar as religious polities preceded secular, 
ideological polities. If Muscovy was, in fact, a “theocratic absolutism,” then Leontovitsch 
perpetrated an anachronism by reading the ideological mentality back into the sixteenth 
century.
The virtues of Leontovitsch’s book are reverse images of its weaknesses. His emphasis 
on Ivan’s “legal revolution” forced readers to consider whether Russian socialism and the 
1917 revolution amounted to echoes of Ivan’s earlier, more profound revolution against 
property. Leontovitsch’s term “legal revolution” focused readers’ attention on the possi-
bility of a revolution based on statutory innovation as well as on state violence. Finally, 
Leontovitsch’s book on Ivan IV prepared the way for his later book on Russian liberalism, 
where he defined liberalism’s method as the “unfettering” or “unbinding” of the individu-
al. Both books flowed from a comprehensive conception of the Russian historical process 
that Leontovitsch had painstakingly worked out in Prague, Paris and Berlin.
176 This point about the Time of Troubles can be found in: Leontovitsch V. V. Die Rechtsumwälzung… 
S. 116, fn. 1.
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V
In retrospect, it is astonishing that Leontovitsch finished his small book on Ivan IV. 
Even though he had the benefit of an excellent domestic education in Kiev, of training in 
the Naumenko school, and then of study in Prague and Paris, his life after 1917 can only 
be described as a fractured existence. He escaped death in the Volunteer Army, avoid-
ed denunciation as a “socially hostile element” in Kiev, reconnected with his family in 
Prague, and made the best of his educational possibilities in the Russian imperial diaspora 
only to take up a series of academic posts in Nazi Germany. In Berlin he methodically, and 
cautiously, made himself into an analyst of Soviet power, a critic of modern dictatorship, 
and a historian of sixteenth-century Muscovy. In Germany, against considerable odds, he 
held to his religious beliefs and, with the aid of his wife and others, linked his Orthodox 
outlook to her Lutheranism. His religious outlook helped him see the errors of National 
Socialism and to grasp what he might do in his scholarship to resist its slogans. 
It will not do to describe Leontovitsch’s intellectual network in the 1930s and 1940s — 
his quiet friendship with Makarov, his admiration for Chizhevskii and Stepun — as a 
political or intellectual “circle,” for that word implies the possibility of regular meetings 
to exchange ideas. Nor was his network a political “cell”: so far as we know, Leontovitsch 
belonged to no political party and cannot even be said to have taken part in a political 
“movement.” He and other members of the imperial diaspora who rejected both Soviet 
power and National Socialism were, in spite of their similarity of outlooks, frighteningly 
alone. Perhaps that is a common fate of decent human beings in dark times. 
References
Beliaev I. D. Lektsii po istorii russkago zakonodatel’stva. Moscow, Tipo.-Lit. S. A. Petrovskogo i N. P. Panina 
Printing House., 1879, 730 p. (In Russian)
Berkefeld W. Malen’kii kruzhok v Galle. D. I. Chizhevskii. Izbrannoe. In 3 vols. Vol. I. Materialy k biografii 
(1894–1977). Moscow, Biblioteka-fond “Russkoe zarubezh’e” — Russkii put’ Publ., 2007, pp. 309–315. 
(In Russian)
Brandenberger D. National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Nation-
al Identity. Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2002, 378 p.
Chicherin B. N. Dukhovnyia i dogovornyia gramoty velikikh i udel’nykh kniazei. Obzor istorii russkago prava. 
Moscow, Izdanie K. Soldatenkova i N. Shchepkina, 1858, 389 p. (In Russian)
Chicherin B. N. Oblastnye uchrezhdeniia Rossii v XVII-m veke. Moscow, Publishing House of Aleksandr 
Semen, 1856, 606 p. (In Russian)
Diakonov M. A. Ocherki obshchestvennago i gosudarstvennago stroia drevnei Rusi, 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 
Pravo Publ., 1908, 527 p. (In Russian)
Diakonov M. A. Vlast’ Moskovskikh gosudarei. Ocherki iz istorii politicheskikh idei drevnei Rusi do kontsa 
XVI veka. St. Petersburg, Printing House of I. N. Skorokhodova, 1889, 227 p. (In Russian)
Fedotov G. P. Sviatoi Filipp, Mitropolit Moskovskii. Paris, YMCA Press, 1928, 224 pp. (In Russian)
Gershenzon M. Zhizn’ M. S. Pechorina. Moscow, Put’ Publ., 1910, 233 p. (In Russian)
Golubinskii E. E. Istoriia russkoi tserkvi. In 2 vols, 4 pts. Vol. I. Period Pervij. Kievskij ili domongol’skij. Pervaja 
polovina toma. Moscow, Imperatorskoe obschchestvo istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh Publ., 1901, 969 p. 
(In Russian)
Golubinskii E. E. Istoriia russkoi tserkvi. In 2 vols, 4 pts. Vol. I. Period Pervij. Kievskij ili domongol’skij. Vto-
raja polovina toma. Moscow, Imperatorskoe obschchestvo istorii I drevnostei rossiiskikh Publ., 1904, 
926 p. (In Russian)
Golubinskii E. E. Istoriia russkoi tserkvi. In 2 vols, 4 pts. Vol. II. Period Vtoroj Moskovskii. Ot nashestvija 
mongolov do mitropolita Makarija vkliuchitel’no. Pervaja polovina toma. Moscow, Imperatorskoe ob-
schchestvo istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh Publ., 1900, 919 p. (In Russian)
Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2018. Т. 63. Вып. 2 595
Golubinskii E. E. Istoriia russkoi tserkvi. In 2 vols, 4 pts. Vol. III. Period Vtoroj Moskovskii. Ot nashestvija 
mongolov do mitropolita Makarija vkliuchitel’no. Vtoraja polovina toma. Moscow, Imperatorskoe ob-
schchestvo istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh Publ., 1911, 616 p. (In Russian)
Hauriou M. La science sociale traditionnelle. Paris, L. Larose Publ., 1896, 432 p.
Hufen C. Fedor Stepun. Ein politischer Intellektueller aus Russland in Europa. Die Jahre 1884–1945. Berlin, 
Lukas Verlag Publ., 2001, 583 S.
Kapterev N. F. Svetskie arkhereiskie chinovniki drevnei Rusi. Moscow, Tipografiia Sovremennye izvestiia, 
1874, 236 p. (In Russian)
Korthaase W. Chto proiskhodilo s glavnym sochineniem Komenskogo ‘Consultatio catholica’ s 1934  po 
1945 god. D. I. Chizhevskii. Izbrannoe. In 3 vols. Vol. I. Materialy k biografii (1894–1977). Moscow, 
Biblioteka-fond “Russkoe zarubezh’e” — Russkii put’ Publ., 2007, pp. 316–327. (In Russian)
Korthaase W. Dmitrii Chizhevskii i rodina ego vybora Germaniia. Slavonic Library at the National Library 
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